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Introduction 
We know that anthropocentrism motivates anthropocentric practices and institutions..1. 
The reverse is also true, although less often recognized. The feedback from even such an 
obvious social development as the increasing concentration of humans in exclusively 
human environments may underwrite and inscribe anthropocentrism at least as insistently 
as anthropocentrism in turn underwrites and inscribes that "humanization." The prevailing 
values arise within a world that is profoundly and beguilingly anthropocentrized. It is 
surely no surprise that they give philosophical expression to anthropocentrism. 
But these very interconnections make the position of non-anthropocentrism particularly 
difficult — or so, anyway, I will argue. We know that in the largely urbanized and 
technological environment where most of our philosophical discussions take place, non-
anthropocentrism almost always remains merely an abstract, philosophical position. 
Academic philosophers (and I write as one) seem to take it for granted that we can 
nonetheless think and speak about it clearly, even in sealed seminar rooms between jaunts 
on the freeway. But can we actually do so? Does not our own ecological perspective 
itself, systematically applied, suggest that human thought must be understood as more 
limited to and profoundly constituted by its "environments" — in this case, profoundly 
anthropocentrized "environments?" We do know, or suspect, that a genuine non-
anthropocentrism has been instantiated in other cultures and alternative practices. But 
they are also cultures and practices that themselves stand at a huge and perhaps 
unbridgeable distance from the world within which we are trying to envision them. Once 
again, then, mightn't we be in the strange position of attempting to explicate a sort of 
ethics of which only the vaguest outlines can emerge, for us, now? 
To answer these questions requires that we reflect on the "ecology" of environmental 
ethics itself. This essay does not advance some new non-anthropocentric ethic that 
somehow avoids these difficulties. It does not appeal to a way of knowing somehow 
transcending the cultural practices and institutions to which I want to point. We do have 
very real intuitions of other ways. Nonetheless I suspect, they must remain radically 
underdeveloped, barely articulable and always marginal, until we begin to develop a 
corresponding set of practices. The necessary philosophical language to speak of them 
itself waits upon a new sort of practice. The non-anthropocentric project in philosophical 
ethics therefore must be approached with great modesty and circumspection, and our 
philosophical formulations are best advised to remain quite provisional — more 
provisional than they sometimes have been! — for a long time to come. But this should 
not necessarily be a discouraging or disempowering conclusion. On the contrary, I 
believe that it points toward a different and deeply rewarding kind of project: 
reconstituting the sorts of relationships and environments that have been destroyed. We 
need to deanthropocentrize the world rather than, first and foremost, to develop and 
systematize non-anthropocentrism — for world and thought co-evolve. We can only 
create an appropriate non-anthropocentrism as we begin to build a progressively less 
anthropocentric world. 
The Making of Anthropocentrism 
Here and now, the anthropocentrized world shapes our most basic terms and frames of 
reference, even the philosophical questions to which non-anthropocentrism itself is 
supposed to be an answer. One of the most basic questions of environmental ethics, for 
example, is supposed to be whether "we" should open the gates of moral considerability 
to "other" animals, and to rivers and mountains, etc. But consider how historically and 
culturally peculiar that "we" actually is. Historically the "we" hardly ever even included 
all humans. For the Greeks "we" meant the city, or at most Greece. Correspondingly, as 
we know, many native peoples used the term "people" to refer only to themselves. At the 
same time, the "we" often crossed species lines. Mary Midgley emphasizes that almost all 
of the ancient life patterns are "mixed communities" of humans and an enormous variety 
of other creatures, from dogs (our relation to whom she calls "symbiotic"), to reindeer, 
weasels, elephants, shags, horses, pigs, etc. — and in genuinely social, two-way 
relationships..2. 
Of course there are sweeping philosophical dynamics that contributed to the rise of an 
anthropocentric ethic. Yet one crucial overlooked factor is surely the changing human 
environment itself..3. Looked at ecologically, the increasingly anthropocentric 
constitution of the "we" is in large part a consequence of the growing isolation of humans 
from any open-ended encounter with other lifeforms, an isolation that for many of us is 
now nearly complete. That isolation in turn is a consequence of the relentless 
humanization of nearly all environments and the increasing concentration of humans in 
the mostly relentlessly humanized of them. 
Consider even the academic offices and seminar rooms in which we talk and think about 
these matters. No animals are allowed in my building, and even children are rare. The 
best that can be said for it is that the windows open. Given this kind of setting, it is not 
surprising that only adult, "rational"/discursive, human creatures stand out for ethical 
philosophy. Once again, of course, that way of isolating ourselves from the rest of the 
world owes something to a pre-existing notion of who "we" are. Here I only want to 
stress that the reverse is also true, and at least equally significant: our notion of the "we" 
is partly constituted and is surely sustained and reinforced by the character of our living 
and working spaces themselves. 
"We" include no animals, either: that is, no other animals. Indeed, the modern category of 
"animal" is being systematically reconstructed. Domestication and genetic manipulation 
have become fine arts, and their effects are pervasive. Breeding for the most efficient 
meat production is so advanced that Frank Perdue's chickens are apparently no longer 
even capable of walking, so rapidly do their bodies overgrow their legs. Docility is also 
systematically selected for. Most drastically, the actual conditions under which other 
animals are made to live cripple any sociability, competence, or even minimal physical 
abilities on the part of those animals. The point then is not so much that this crippling is 
routinely covered up or denied by the producers, but rather that this kind of "production" 
itself turns the animals into just what the stereotypes imagine them: incompetent, stupid, 
unsociable, slothful. Soon even to think "animal" will invoke only the radically remade 
and reduced creatures of factory farm or zoo, or at best the also-problematic "pet." 
A similar kind of anthropocentrization occurs with natural places. Again wildness and 
difference are systematically eradicated. The land itself is being turned into something 
that simply mirrors and reflects and serves humans. Again, this point is certainly not new. 
But it has an edge that we must see more clearly. No doubt it is true that our exploitation 
of the land reveals an anthropocentric attitude toward it. But that very same exploitation 
also creates and reinforces anthropocentric attitudes. For Heidegger a power station itself 
can turn a river into a water power supplier. Technology itself transforms the world into 
"standing reserve.".4. It is not that the turn has first to be made in thought and only later 
in "the world." Again, anthropocentrism coevolves with an anthropocentrized world. 
Of course humans have always appropriated land for homes, farms, etc. But the 
traditional patterns always also allowed a space for wildness, indeed lived within it. 
Beyond the city walls lay unpredictable encounters with wild things, including other 
humans. Hans Peter Duerr argues that for the medievals the boundary between wilderness 
and civilization was permeable and often-crossed, like a low fence..5. In the country, at 
least, invitations to the wild lay at every turn. Strange animals roamed there, and at night 
the vast panorama of the skies opened up. Even the blossoms of the yew tree under which 
one might fall asleep were mild hallucinogens. An afternoon's nap might turn into a trip 
to the Venus Mountain. But now the animals the yews and the vastness of the night are 
gone, and the Venusberg is the stuff only of opera. Sometimes the wild is deliberately 
eradicated, as for example when the early Christians deliberately chopped down the 
ancient world's sacred groves. The wild potentials that remain are pushed behind what 
Duerr describes as a solid, steep prison wall. Tom Birch describes wildness as 
"incarcerated," not just physically isolated and violated, but also conceptually confined 
behind definitions of its utility that exclude the spontaneity and also the radical challenge 
of the wild..6. How could "wild" philosophy nonetheless stay free? 
The Anthropocentrized Agenda of Environmental Ethics 
It is not merely that the anthropocentrized world inclines its inhabitants toward 
anthropocentric philosophies rather than other possible views. Anthropocentrization also 
defines the terms according to which any alternative view might emerge, the expectations 
in terms of which it must be defended, and the sorts of persuasive appeals that it can 
make. In fact, I now want to argue, the anthropocentrized word closes out or distorts 
almost all philosophical alternatives to anthropocentrism, thus narrowly restricting the 
agenda for allowable challenge, and marginalizing all other possibilities. 
In a provocative challenge, Jim Cheney has argued that a certain kind of radical 
environmentalism has been tempted into a "Neostoic" philosophy — an identification 
with Nature on the level of the universe as a whole — because Neostoicism offers a way 
of identifying with nature without actually giving up control. "Wholeness, health, and 
connectedness" are the motivators, says Cheney but they are sought and achieved through 
metaphysics: thus this view — he calls it "Ecosophy S" — achieves the "superstructure," 
as it were, of identification, but in fact "alienation" remains. 
[E]xperience [of the world] is at one remove; it is not so much experience 
as it is an alternative to experience which — grounded ... in the 
impersonal, authoritarian voice of metaphysics — is safe, insulated, 
alienated..7. 
The appeal to Neostoic metaphysics becomes a kind of philosophical substitute for "real 
encounter" with wild Nature. 
I agree with Cheney that the level of abstraction in some kinds of environmental 
philosophy is unfortunately high, and that it carries a strange sense of disconnection for a 
kind of philosophizing that takes itself to be speaking for real connection. But, given the 
argument above, I might describe the psychodymanics rather differently. The experiences 
for which "Ecosophy S" is trying to speak are inevitably marginalized in a thoroughly 
anthropocentrized culture. They are simply not accessible to most people or even 
understandable to many. Wild experience may actually be the real starting-point for 
"Ecosophy S," then, but there are only a few, ritualized and hackneyed ways to actually 
speak for it in a culture that does not share it. Thus a radical environmental philosophy is 
driven to abstraction. It is not escapism but a kind of resignation. The driving force is not 
even so much that most people expect ethics to appeal to principles, to speak abstractly 
(although this is also true). Rather, it is that otherwise most people, including many 
converts to non-anthropocentrism, would have no idea what non-anthropocentrists could 
possibly be talking about. Things are now so bad that vaguest extension of human ethical 
terms to Nature is the only way we have to make natural values seem comprehensible. 
A related issue is the alleged "sentimentality" of, especially, the attempt to speak for other 
animals. I have spoken of the remaking of animals. One effect of factory farming 
chickens or veal calves, or of using physically restrained chimps for drug experiments, is 
to terrorize, cripple, and debase the animals to the point that the pitiful creatures that 
result do in fact seem to be utterly implausible candidates for anything but human "use." 
But then people who work with those animals may indeed find it impossible to feel any 
serious concern for them. People who speak up for them will indeed seem to be speaking 
sentimentally, and also may in fact know the animals less well. After all, we are not just 
speaking up against the treatment of particular animals now, but also and perhaps most 
fundamentally against the debasement of the species: the refusal to honour the 
autonomous potential of such creatures and the ultimate destruction of the very possibility 
of autonomy or spontaneity. Only thus can we bring into focus the deliberately 
undertaken process of turning certain animals into creatures who have no serious claim 
on us. But therefore, in a world in which that process is nonetheless a fait accompli, we 
are left to speak for what might have been, not so much against the suffering and 
violation of this particular animal but for a vision of an appropriate life for this kind of 
animal — and, again, some non-industrialized creature, not bred for the factory farm. 
Inevitably it is a matter of vision, speculation, sentiment, horror. 
Other animals are first turned into radically subordinate begins, in the end "machines," so 
that the old ways of speaking for them (or the old lack of a need to "speak for" them in 
the first place, since in at least some ways they could speak for themselves) vanishes, and 
we are left with only indirect ways of speaking, speculative and "nostalgic." Then those 
ways of speaking too are driven toward more and more general and perhaps also 
"principled" statements, carrying less and less actual force and invoke a set of 
possibilities at a greater and greater distance. Thus one might pessimistically see the 
appeal to animal "right," in particular, as the last line of defense for many animals, rather 
than the dawning of a new age. And, again, it is a tragically weak last line of defense in a 
world where domestication and factory farming leave so few animals even barely 
plausible candidates for rights. I have argued elsewhere that even the philosophical 
appeal to the "intrinsic value" of Nature might be seen as a similarly desperate rhetorical 
device, rather than the inauguration of a new relation between humans and the nonhuman 
world..8. Perhaps the urgency with which intrinsic value is now so liberally spread 
around is only another sign that the instrumentalization of the world has reached a fever 
pitch. 
Consider finally the apparently simple matter of what sorts of criticism are generally 
regarded as "responsible" and what sorts of alternatives are generally regarded as 
"realistic." I want to suggest that the anthropocentrized world, in fact the product of an 
absolutely immense project of world-reconstruction that has reached a kind of frenzy in 
the modern age, has become simply the taken-for-granted reference-point for what is 
"real," for what must be accepted by any responsible criticism. The anthropocentrized 
world defines the very limits of intelligent discourse, thus constraining and reshaping the 
discourse we attempt. 
The simplest example: for at least the last twenty years of my life, I have hardly ever been 
out of earshot of the noise of some internal combustion engine for more than a few hours 
at a time. At any moment we merely need to raise our heads to listen for a moment, and 
the familiar growls and drones are there. This absolute pervasiveness of internal 
combustion engines is of course utterly new, all of it confined to the last century and most 
to the last generation. The environmental consequences are staggering, the long-term 
effects of the constant noise on "mental health" are clearly worrisome, etc. And yet all of 
this has so thoroughly embedded itself in our lives that even the mildest proposals to 
restrict internal combustion engines, to close off certain areas to airplanes or cars or 
simply to make it possible to bicycle to work without fearing for life or limb, have an air 
of the almost impossibly radical about them. The suddenly-transmuted world, so fantastic 
even fifty years ago, now just as suddenly defines the very limits of imagination. 
Philosophy is co-opted just as effectively. Many of our colleagues take a careful, neutral, 
skeptical style as a point of pride. But in actual practice this style is only careful, neutral, 
skeptical in certain directions. Suggest anything different, and it all comes into play. The 
project of going beyond anthropocentrism looks wild, incautious, intellectually over-
excited, and one is invited with varying degrees of alarm to explore the ways in which we 
might gerrymander a somewhat more environmentally sensitive ethic that doesn’t “go so 
far” as to actually contemplate ethical connections to the nonhuman world. Meanwhile, 
however, anthropocentrism itself is almost never scrutinized in the same way. Is 
anthropocentrism in fact only an appropriately cautious, natural fallback position for a 
skeptical mind who would prefer to “wait and see” about the more “radical” possibilities? 
Or mightn’t it strike one as just a little bizarre for an human ethical system systematically 
to debase every other living thing on the planet –when it notices them at all? 
Some environmentalists have tried to reclaim words like "conservative" for themselves 
while pinning "radical" on the other side, a strategy no doubt worth trying. But I am more 
concerned with the prior and more common problem that this "other side" very seldom 
emerges as a side at all. The usual categories presuppose a vision of "the world" that is 
ratified below the level of consciousness by the omnipresence of noise, trash on the 
beaches and jet trails in the sunset, the bodies of animals available for our consumption at 
every turn. Non-anthropocentric criticism then truly is "unrealistic," not merely because 
anthropocentrism defines the "realistic," but because "reality" itself is now so thoroughly 
anthropocentrized. 
First Stages the Struggle Toward Non-Anthropocentrism 
The philosophical critique of anthropocentrism, then, barely touches the core of the 
present problem: the world that anthropocentrism rationalizes and reflects. It is no 
surprise therefore that non-anthropocentrism has won the barest toehold even in 
philosophy, and that, even for the sympathetic, the actual philosophical forms into which 
non-anthropocentrism has struggled often prove unpersuasive, or too weak, or too, well, 
rational. But a very different kind of project may instead be required of us; and this too 
has been struggling to find expression in non-anthropocentric philosophical work. 
I have argued that we have so thoroughly reconstructed the other animals, for instance, 
and so efficiently closed ourselves off from them, that we hardly have any idea of what it 
would be to actually relate to them in an open-ended sort of way. But then the actual task 
before us is to begin to reconstitute an open-ended relationship, discovering its 
appropriate ethic in the process. We should not suppose that we could construct a 
systematic non-anthropocentrism in the privacy of our studies or seminar rooms at all. 
Instead we must take up more systematically the entire question of the constitution of 
relationship in the first place..9. Cheney writes, for instance, that 
What must be explored are the necessary conditions..for the emergence of healthy 
voices.... The real work is in providing a context, a practice, in which conversation with 
coyote [e.g.] is made possible. The question is whether ecological consciousness is to 
function for us as a totalizing consciousness which, while praising diversity in nature, 
often seems quite insistent on listening to only one voice..., or whether...primacy will be 
given to the voices which emerge in ...genuine encounter..10. 
By making a space or "providing a context" for "genuine encounter," again, we not only 
begin to constitute (or re-constitute) relationships that do not yet exist — Cheney's point 
— but we also begin, in the only real way possible, to establish the preliminaries for a 
fully-fleshed non-anthropocentric ethic.
Just recognizing how very resistant we are to "genuine encounter" — indeed cleverly and 
almost instinctively resistant — is a necessary first step. Unimpressed by personal 
encounters or by musicians who sing with the whales,.11. for example, we are often 
unduly impressed by scientific arguments. But this sort of argument takes seriously the 
demand to show that other animals can be companions, when precisely that demand 
already represents a way of closing ourselves off from the creatures in question (right: in 
question). Too often, even when they study animals whole, scientists approach animals 
only from a posture of careful neutrality about whether or not, as one dolphin researcher 
put it, "there's somebody in there." Human beings trip over their feet when treated with 
such distance and skepticism, and there is no reason to expect other animals to do any 
better, especially when they are exquisitely more sensitive to the affective environment 
than we are. Not to mention that being "in there" is exactly what fully sensed creatures 
are not, we are "out here," alive in a rich and responsive world..12. We must begin to 
explore what it would mean to relate to them in kind. 
Most of us struggling toward non-anthropocentrism believe that "encounter" is possible 
as well with natural places, rock formations or rivers or pine-covered dunes. But here too, 
now, the onus lies upon us to make the space for such encounters to occur, without trying 
to predetermine their shape. Here too, then, the first moment of the ethical relation we 
must constitute is not an attempt to deduce a non-anthropocentric ethic . priori, as if we 
had enough "evidence" to answer such a question. Instead the first moment must be a 
reaching out, opening the possibility of being touched rather than touching, whatever — 
we can hardly yet say — might eventuate. Suppose for example that "Old Faithful," still 
scintillating under coloured lights and barely beyond the stage at which the Park Service 
added soap to the waters to make sure the eruptions came off on schedule, might someday 
have to be approached only as the Indians once did: after elaborate fasts and ceremonies, 
perhaps first daring to come near only in dreams, only then in person, purified and alone, 
after days of hiking through the bubbling earth and nights sleepless for the scent of 
grizzly bear. The name itself would have to change; certainly our interventions to force 
"faithfulness" must end. Or again: the real problem with Ronald Reagan's notorious 
remark that "If you've seen one redwood tree, you've seen them all" is not most 
fundamentally his refusal to recognize nonhuman intrinsic value, or the ecological 
absurdity of fetishizing a particular tree, but the simple fact that, like almost all of the rest 
of us, he never really "saw" even one redwood tree: that is, never truly experienced it in 
any open-ended way. Suppose that, to speak for the redwoods, we actually allowed 
ourselves to re-experience, to re-approach, the trees themselves. Then, after perhaps 
lifetimes of intimacy, we might be entitled to say something about what kind of 
relationship is possible and what ethical connection might or might not be demanded. 
Right now we are hardly able to begin to say. 
De-Anthropocentrizing the World 
The real work, says Cheney, is to create a context within which "genuine encounter" 
becomes possible. The task is to begin to reconstitute an open-ended relation to Nature; to 
deanthropocentrize the world enough to allow a genuine non-anthropocentrism to begin 
to emerge. Let me stress that I do not mean that "a genuine non-anthropocentrism" is 
somehow already there, ready to emerge, and that all we need to do is to somehow open 
up to it. No doubt that is a possible view, but it is not mine. It is not that "Old Faithful" 
has been whispering its real name to us all along, and we just need to begin to listen. I see 
the task more pragmatically, as a kind of dialogic or co-evolutionary experiment in which 
we too participate. The task of "connecting," on this view, is not to make ourselves still, 
though it certainly is to quiet down. 
For just one illustration, consider the quite literal possibility of setting aside certain places 
as quiet zones: places where automobile engines and lawnmowers and low-flying 
airplanes are not allowed. Again, the proposal is not to totally exclude all human activity. 
Indeed it would be crucial for people to actually live in such places. But they would leave 
their power tools and stereos and automobiles somewhere else. The aim would be 
appropriately modest too: simply to make it possible to hear the birds and the winds, and 
to live in the silence. If bright outside lights were also banned, one could see the stars at 
night and feel the slow pulsations of the light over the seasons. 
One imagines progressively differently designed houses, a life slowly edging back toward 
embeddedness in natural places, quiet talks in the gardens and festivals at moonrise. 
Instead of another ten thousand suburban developments all the same, in short, a little 
creative zoning could make space for increasingly divergent styles: experiments in 
recycling and energy self-sufficiency, for example; or mixed communities of humans and 
other species, perhaps with the intention of opening up inter-species communication or at 
any rate serious co-inhabitation; or "ecosteries" on the model of the old monasteries,.13. 
or other possibilities not yet even imagined. 
This is intentionally a modest example: something achievable, "green," close to home, 
and of course in places already underway. If it seems utopian all the same, consider that, 
as I have argued, a certain appearance of unrealism on these matters is almost necessary. 
Reflect also that the simple quietness evoked here was the more or less universal 
condition of rural life until quite recently. Unplug our outside lights, reroute a few roads, 
and we already have a first approximation. 
First approximations to "mixed communities" are possible for many of us already. I too 
spend the academic year in the rigorously humanized environments already described. 
But every spring, when I begin to garden, my life takes on a different shape. The "we," 
for instance, that in my office seems to include only humans, now changes. "We" are now 
my co-gardeners and beneficiaries — the plants themselves, obviously; the neighbour 
who plows and advises, the friends and soup kitchen that get the extra cucumbers and 
tomatoes, the raccoons who rummage in the compost pile, the horses whose manure 
fertilizes, the insects who make their homes among the vegetables and consume their 
more destructive cousins. The "them" are the various threats: other plants and insects, the 
groundhogs and deer that take more than they need or destroy more than they get, the kid 
down the hill (quite human) who lobs baseballs into the corn. Species lines do not 
determine my allegiances here; rather, my alliance is to one multi-species community and 
against various others who emerge as invaders and disrupters. One small step for a man, 
one fairly significant transformation of consciousness. But gardening is available to most 
of us now, and there is no reason that a "green" politics could not insist upon making it 
available to all. 
By taking the restructuring of human communities as an illustration I do not mean to 
exclude other obviously vital activities, such as preserving the wilderness. Certainly the 
wild places that remain to us should be protected. For some places and some species even 
the near-total exclusion of humans may be necessary. Nonetheless, the project of 
developing a non-anthropocentric ethic, now conceived as making a space for the co-
evolution of a less anthropocentric ethic within a less anthropocentrized world, does 
redirect our main focus toward the points of interaction, encounter, rather than 
separation. Certainly the aim is not to push humans out of the picture entirely, but rather 
to open up the possibility of relation between humans and the rest of Nature. We need to 
pay much more attention to places where humans and other creatures, honoured in their 
wildness and potential relatedness, can come together, perhaps warily but at least openly. 
Older traditions of "naturalist" writing already offer a set of categories for thinking about 
such places..14. More recently, Wendell Berry takes up similar questions in his essay 
"Getting Along with Nature." After arguing that the opposition between "purely natural" 
and "purely human" environments is both chimerical and unappealing — we would not 
want to live in either, even if we could — Berry goes on to discuss what he calls "the 
phenomenon of edge or margin, that we know to be one of the powerful attractions of a 
diversified landscape, both to wildlife and to humans." "Margins" are places where 
domesticity and wildness meet. Mowing his small hayfield with a team of horses, Berry 
encounters a hawk who lands quite close to him, watching carefully but without fear. The 
hawk comes, he says, 
because of the conjunction of the small pasture and its wooded borders, of open hunting 
ground and the security of trees.... The human eye itself seems drawn to such margins, 
hungering for the difference made in the countryside by a hedgy fencerow, a stream, or a 
grove of trees. These margins are biologically rich, the meeting of two kinds of 
habitat....15. 
The hawk would not have come, he says, if the field had been larger, or if there had been 
no trees, or if he had been plowing with a tractor. Encounter is a fragile thing, and we 
need to pay careful attention to its preconditions, just as it is itself a precondition for the 
emergence of non-anthropocentrism in turn. 
There are many kinds of "margins." Jim Nollman, speaking of the seashore, reminds us 
that the aborigine shamans knew how to call and speak with the dolphins. Furthermore, 
even this attention to "margins" is only one instance of what it might mean to try to make 
space for "genuine encounter." For now, though, the point is that these thoughts open up a 
realm of ethics very different from the familiar philosophical arguments and abstractions. 
It is not to deny that certain arguments and abstractions are still necessary. But it is to 
suggest that, in the world as we know it, they tend to work in an almost complete 
vacuum. Their air of unreality is no surprise. To create or restore a world in which they 
are grounded and real is our desperate but necessary task. 
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